Americans' attitudes toward political parties have changed considerably since the 1950s. The early work on partisanship found that citizens held a deep attachment to political parties; that they interpreted the complex world of politics through the lens of partisanship; and that this profound connection made it unlikely that voters would develop loyalty to a third party (Campbell et al. 1960) . Subsequent research, based on trends in the 1970s and 1980s, suggested that rising issue awareness alongside institutional and generational changes contributed to weakening Americans' partisan attachments (Beck 1976; Nie et al. 1976; Polsby 1983) . Wattenberg (1998) In a Poll Trends article that appeared in Public Opinion Quarterly in 1996 , Christian Collet (1996 examined perceptions of the parties and the party system. He presented survey data that showed discontent with the two-party system and strong support for a possible third party candidate in presidential elections. Collet's conclusions suggested that antipathy was directed toward the two-party system, and not toward the Democratic and Republican parties, both of which still commanded deep loyalty. He also found that the public wanted more choice at the polls, not necessarily the replacement of Gold a major party by a new party. In short, Collet found significant discontent with the twoparty system, but ambivalence about the electoral and governing prospects of a new party.
Collet's article examined partisan polling trends through 1995. It appeared not long after H. Ross Perot ran one of the most successful third-party campaigns in American history, and was on the verge of a second presidential campaign. This article picks up where Collet left off, examining perceptions of the political parties and the party system from 1996 until 2014. There is reason to expect that attitudes toward the parties would have changed since the mid-1990s. The partisan-driven impeachment of President Clinton, two protracted wars, economic downturn, and increasingly vitriolic partisan polarization, especially in Congress, may well have produced not only greater dissatisfaction with the two major parties, but also a heightened receptivity toward a new party competing on the national scene.
The analysis of trends in public opinion toward political parties is divided into three sections. The first examines how assessments of the Democratic and Republican parties changed since the mid-1990s;the second section describes how the public perceives differences between the parties, and the third examines public satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the party system as well as the public's openness to a new national third party. (Tables 1 and 2 about here) There are several noteworthy findings. First, there is no question that public esteem for both parties has fallen since the mid-1990s. In the early years of the time series, the Democrats' favorability rating was at or just below 60 percent. In 2006, it dropped below 50 percent for the first time, and has remained below that mark since 2010. In 2012, for the first time, the Democrats' unfavorability rating was higher than its favorability score.
Assessments of the Major Parties
Perceptions of the Republicans followed a similar pattern. The party's favorability rating dropped quite dramatically over the years. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Republican Party favorability generally stood above the 50 percent mark. In recent years, it has not come close to that. In 2013, only one-third of Americans said they had a favorable opinion of the Republican Party, and the percentage of those unfavorable exceeded those favorable by an overwhelming 25 points (58 -33). Although perceptions of both parties have deteriorated over time, the Republicans appear to have taken the brunt of growing public discontent.
The Republican Party has also consistently suffered from a lower favorability rating than the Democrats. This is true in all years, except 2002. In some years, this gap ANES also has asked respondents if there is anything in particular they like or dislike about the Democratic and Republican parties. The most notable shift has occurred on the Democratic side (see Table 6 ). In 2012, for the first time, the percentage of individuals who express at least one dislike of the Democratic Party exceeds the percentage expressing a like. This marks a major change from prior years, where the ratio was consistently greater than one (see 3 rd column of Table 6 ). The Republicans have typically drawn more dislikes than likes, although that ratio was particularly unfavorable in 2008 (see Table 7 ).
(Tables 6 and 7 about here)
Perceptions of Partisan Difference
The evidence reviewed to this point indicates that Americans have grown increasingly negative toward both parties in recent years. One possible cause is heightened partisan polarization. To what extent do Americans view the parties as different from each other, and has that changed over time?
To answer these questions, I examine three survey items that ask respondents about their perceptions of partisan difference and ideology. The first one, from ANES, asks respondents if they perceive important differences in what the major parties stand for (see Table 8 ). The evidence here is decisive: We have seen a significant growth in the proportion of Americans who believe that there are major differences between the parties.
In 1996, that figure was 64 percent, and by 2012, it had jumped to over 80 percent. It is apparent that, at a minimum, the public has recognized the growing elite-level polarization, and increasingly sees the parties as very different. Additional evidence supports this conclusion. The ANES also asks respondents where they place each party on a 7-point ideological spectrum (1=liberal; 7=conservative). Table 9 includes the mean placement of each party since 1996, along with the difference between the respective Gold means. Not surprisingly, Republicans are consistently rated as more conservative than
Democrats. But the size of this gap has grown, such that by 2012, it exceeded 2.5 points (on a 7-point scale) for the first time since ANES first asked this question in 1972.
Interestingly, much of this change is the product of growing perceptions of the Democrats as liberal. Whereas the mean Republican placement has consistently been near the conservative end of the scale (above 5), the Democratic mean has been nearer to the midpoint of the scale (3.5), until 2012 (when it dropped to 2.66).
( Tables 8 and 9 about here)
Questions asked by commercial survey organizations also support this finding that the public has increasingly come to view the Democrats as liberal, indeed "too liberal."
Since 2009, the proportion of Americans who perceive the Democratic Party as too liberal has been close to 50 percent, whereas in earlier years, it was at 40 percent or even below (see Table 10 ). This has been accompanied by a drop in the proportion of Americans who say that the Democrats' views are "about right." On the Republican side, there has been greater stability over time, with those who see the party as too conservative holding steady, at around 40 percent (see Table 11 ). By 2010, the proportion perceiving the Republicans as too conservative was 9 points lower than the proportion seeing the Democrats as too liberal. This is one advantage the Democrats appear to have lost -the perception that they are a more mainstream party.
( Tables 10 and 11 about here)
Evaluations of the Party System
In recent years, Americans have expressed more negativity toward both parties, and they have come to view the parties as more ideologically distinct. Have these patterns produced greater receptivity to possible changes in the party system, in particular the possibility of a new third party contesting national elections?
There have been various survey questions about the effectiveness of the two-party system. Regardless of the wording, strong support exists in recent years for more electoral choice. Since 1996, PEW (along with NYT/CBS and PSRA) has asked
Americans if the country should have a third political party to compete with the Democrats and Republicans (see Table 12 ). In most years, a majority of Americans agree that we need a third party -generally 45-55 percent adopt this view. Likewise, large
proportions (54-67%) support the idea that third parties should run candidates for President, Congress, and state offices (see Table 13 ). Interestingly, in spite of growing negativity toward the major parties, there is still a sizable minority -generally in the 40-50 percent range -that disagree with the statement that the country needs a third political party (see Table 12 ). Some of the variation observed in these tables may be the product of wording differences employed by the various survey organizations, but it appears that the public is open to the idea of a new national political party.
( Tables 12 and 13 about Table 14 ). Although the response patterns here have been volatile, in just about every other year more respondents have stated that a third Gold major party is needed. In some years (2013, 2010, 2007) , about 60 percent of respondents have expressed this view.
( Table 14 about here) Other survey organizations have asked similar questions, albeit less consistently.
In the question asked by NBC/WSJ (see Table 15 ), only 12-15 percent state that the twoparty system works fairly well. Instead, over half the respondents acknowledge that there are real problems with it, and about a third of respondents believe it is so broken that the country needs a third party. In a variation of this question (see Table 16 ), over half of respondents surveyed in 2007 stated that the two-party system does not do a good job of addressing important issues, a large jump from when this question was first asked in 1999.
( Tables 15 and 16 about here) Although there is deep discontent with the two-party system and support for greater electoral choice, in most elections, support for third parties is very weak. Yet when asked generically whether or not they would consider voting for a third-party candidate, sizable majorities say that they would (see Table 17 ). In eight polls conducted between 1999 and 2013, between 52 and 67 percent of respondents said they would consider voting for a third-party presidential candidate. Of course, stating that one will "consider" voting for a third party poses a low threshold. That becomes apparent when the stakes are raised and respondents are asked to specify how "likely" it is that they will vote, or consider voting, for a generic third-party candidate. Whereas 50-65 percent initially state that they will consider voting for a third party candidate, only about one-third of respondents state that it is "likely" that they will vote, or even consider voting, for a third party (see Table 18 ). (Tables 17 and 18 about American democracy would not be enhanced by the creation of a third party (46%, National Survey on Democracy, January 1996). That same year, a majority (53%) stated that a third party would not make much difference in producing better candidates (NYT/CBS, March 1996) . In 2000, a majority (55%) held that third parties end up hurting the election by taking votes away from the major parties (LAT, July 2000). And, on the one question that was replicated over time, strong majorities held that third parties would not make much difference in giving ordinary people more say in government. In 1996, 56 percent held that position; in 2010, 60 percent expressed that view (see Table   19 ).
( Table 19 about here)
Gold

Conclusion
In his 1996 POQ Poll Trends article, Collet concluded that the American public expressed "extreme discontent" toward the party system, though not toward the two parties themselves, and that Americans supported the notion of a new national third party, but would not translate that hypothetical support into support for a particular third party.
Almost twenty years later, we are still in a period of "extreme discontent," but this discontent now extends beyond the party system to the two major parties themselves; and the public is still conflicted between its attachment to the existing parties and a restructuring of the party system that would see the emergence of a new national third party. There is no question that public disdain for both the Democratic and Republican parties has grown considerably since the mid-1990s and that the public understands well the polarization that has gripped political elites. Increasing numbers of Americans have come to see the parties as ideologically far apart, with large percentages stating that the Republicans are too conservative and that the Democrats are too liberal. Paradoxically, although the public is turned off by ideological parties, there is also evidence that partisans have become more critical of their own party for not upholding traditional "liberal" and "conservative" values (PEW, January 2014).
Despite consistent majorities and pluralities who believe that the country needs a third political party and that the Democrats and Republicans inadequately represent the people, only a minority of Americans are likely to consider voting for a third-party candidate-this has remained fairly consistent over time. And there is plenty of ambivalence about the benefits of a third party for American democracy. Unfortunately, many of the questions that measure attitudes toward third parties and the party system are asked sporadically, and more commonly when a prominent third-party candidate (like Perot) emerges. This not only creates an obvious context effect; it also hampers our ability to understand the public's long-term views of the party system. Still, the best evidence suggests that although the Democratic and Republican parties have become the object of deepening disapproval and even contempt, the American public is not quite ready to let go of them. Gallup (RR3): 11/98 35%; 2/99 20%; 7/99 24%; 11/02 (17%); 10/03 16%; 6/06 16%; 9/06 16%; 10/06 16%; 9/07 13%; 2/08 11%; 9/08 15%; 6/09 13%; 5/10 8%; 8/10 9%; 4/11 8%; 9/11 10%; 9/12 11%; 10/13 6%.
Appendix Abbreviations
NYT/CBS (RR1): 2/10 10.45%; 4/10 9.53%; 9/10 8.95%. (landline) 13.3% (cellular); 6/10 12.9% (landline) 9.2% (cellular); 2/11 13.5% (landline) 6.6% (cellular); 1/12 10.7% (landline) 6.4% (cellular); 6/12 11.3% (landline) 5.6% (cellular); 1/13 10.4% (landline) 5.9% (cellular); 3/14 11.2% (landline) 9.8% (cellular).
PEW
PSRA/Newsweek (RR3): 6/07 25.8%; 10/07 24.7%.
Response rates for other surveys were requested but not available. 
